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This paper provides an analysis of screening contracts in a complete but imperfect information environment
as opposed to the usual incomplete information (Bayesian) environment. An agent faces a hold-up situation
while making a cost-reducing speciﬁc investment that is not observed by the principal. To prevent the
hold-up, the agent randomizes his investment strategy and the principal offers a screening contract. The
informational rents provided by the equilibrium contract ﬁnance the investment. Because uncertainty is
endogenous, the equilibrium contract depends only on tastes, technology and on the strategic opportunities
of both players.
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but imperfect information framework instead of the incomplete information Bayesian framework analyzed
in the literature (Baron and Myerson 1982). Consider a ﬁrm (the agent) that sinks an investment to increase
its production capacity of a good desired by its client (the principal). The principal is limited to short-
term contracts: she cannot sign a binding contract before the investment is undertaken. For instance, at the
time of investment, the ﬁrm may know that a demand exists for its product although a client has yet to be
identiﬁed. When exchange ﬁnally takes place, a price-setting principal agrees to pay the agent no more than
his reservation price. Since the agent’s reservation price does not incorporate the sunk cost of investment,
there is a hold-up problem: the agent has less incentive to invest and the beneﬁts of investment may be lost.
When complete binding contracts are available, the hold-up problem can be solved under various in-
formation structures (Rogerson, 1992).
￿ In this paper, a hold-up occurs because the parties are unable to
commit themselves to any contract at the time the investment is made. However, the assumption of symmet-
ric information is relaxed: all costs are the private information of the agent. Tirole (1986) was the ﬁrst to
point out that since the ex post sharing rule that results from a given bargaining process is generally sensitive
to the information structure, the privacy of the investment decision provides a strategic advantage to protect
the return on investment from a hold-up. This idea is further developed as the basis of a theory of screening
contracts in which the asymmetric information is endogenous.
The standard analysis of screening contracts under asymmetric information starts with the Bayesian
notion of a type that resumes the private information of the agent. In incomplete information models,
the distribution of types is exogenous. Any inference drawn with these models about economic structures
depends on the distribution of types. But in many instances of screening, the “type” of an agent refers to
instrumental factors that he controls and that have a well-deﬁned economic value. For instance, a “low-cost
type” results from past investment.
In the framework presented here, the distribution of “types” emerges as the (Nash) equilibrium ran-
domization of the agent’s investment strategy. The model works like a classical principal-agent model to
which an initial investment stage is added. The agent has the opportunity of choosing his “type” at that
stage
￿
, at a price (i.e. the cost of investment). An unobserved randomized strategy allows the agent to
hide his investment behind a veil of noise to prevent a hold-up. In equilibrium, this randomization induces
a common-knowledge endogenous distribution of “types”. Naturally, the principal will offer a screening
contract that provides ex post production incentives. Surprisingly, the equilibrium contract turns out to be a
cost-plus contract.
2There is a long tradition of models with mixed strategy equilibria in complete but imperfect information
settings, but few studies consider the screening problem in this context.
￿ Fudenberg and Tirole (1990)
analyze the moral hazard problem in a way that involves screening. A principal wants her risk averse agent
to exert an effort that increases the probability of a good outcome in a stochastic environment. Towards this
end, the principal offers an incentive contract that links the agent’s compensation to the random outcome,
thereby exposing the agent to some risk. Yet, once the effort is undertaken, there is room to renegotiate the
contract in order to provide insurance to the agent. This renegotiation leads to screening, since the agent
has private information about the amount of effort that was provided and therefore about the likelihood of
a good outcome. Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1990) model is set in an environment with partial commitment:
there is no hold-up problem since the principal can commit to a compensation scheme prior to investment
(effort). Consequently, the contract they study is a maximizer in the set of renegotiation-proof contracts and
the agent’s randomization is directly induced by the contract. In this paper, the contract is an equilibrium
best response to the agent’s randomization.
Gul (2000) analyzes a model of bargaining between a seller and a buyer in an environment similar to
the one presented here. In Gul’s (2000), the buyer has the ex ante opportunity to make an investment that
increases the gains from trade ex post. By allowing the investment to be made privately by the buyer, and by
considering a sequential bargaining subgame of offers and counter-offers, the hold-up problem vanishes as
the length of time between successive offers goes to zero. Gul (2000) puts the emphasis on the bargaining
subgame, which is more complex than the one used here. Information about the buyer’s ex post willingness
to pay is revealed through a process of offers and counter-offers while this study relies on a screening
contract offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Linking the hold-up and the screening problems clariﬁes the role of asymmetric information in explain-
ing screening (nonlinear pricing). The need and the means of screening come from the heterogeneity of the
agent’s characteristics and the monopoly power of the principal (Wilson 1993). Asymmetric information
plays no role in that story; if anything, it reduces the ability of the principal to discriminate agents. On the
other hand, the monopoly power of the principal creates a hold-up problem. Combined with asymmetric
information, the hold-up problem generates the heterogeneity of the agent’s ex post characteristics that justi-
ﬁes the need for ex post screening. According to this view, asymmetric information is an important ancillary
condition that rationalizes screening.
The model is presented and solved in the next section. It is illustrated with three analytical examples.
Comparative statics are pursued in Section 3. The paper concludes with a discussion about normative and
positive issues that favor the use of complete but imperfect information principal-agent models. The Ap-
pendix contains the proofs. 32. The model
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￿ ). Both players have quasi-linear preferences and the principal
























































￿ is the expected opportunity cost of dealing with the principal. This cost includes production
costs as well as any relevant loss of proﬁts (related to outside opportunities) induced by this exchange. If no























an investment in capital. Investment determines the ex post production costs, and can also determine the
proﬁtability of other ventures pursued by the agent affected by this exchange. Let
&
be a thrice continuously
differentiable and strictly convex function that exhibits an unbounded long-run marginal cost as
￿ increases
in order to ensure bounded returns.



















































































































￿ be the solutions to the ﬁrst and second programs. These expressions deﬁne
the conditional ex post supply function
￿
￿

























































￿ . In Figure 1,






￿ ), two short-run average cost curves (with investment levels
D and
￿
￿ ) and the long-run marginal and








are given by the inverse of the marginal cost curves. The value
￿
7 is equal to zero.
E















￿ . The solution
￿
7 is interior.

















￿ . The marginal beneﬁt of capital increases with














. Gains from trade always exist.






































￿ . The ex ante efﬁcient levels of investment




















































￿ , the ex ante and ex post efﬁcient
allocations coincide.
The game has three stages; Figure 2 provides a sketch of its extensive form. It begins with the investment
stage at the initial node where an amount
￿ is invested. The shaded triangle to the right of the initial node
represents the possible investment moves that may be realized. In the standard incomplete information
game, the initial node belongs to Nature and
￿ is a random exogenous type. An alternate approach is to let
this node belong to the agent so that the choice of
￿ becomes part of his strategy.
P










￿ . That stage begins at some node
R
<
that follows the investment move
￿ . If the principal observes the







. Otherwise, her information set is
W .
The second shaded triangle stands for the possible contracts that may be offered at that stage.
The ﬁnal stage is the acceptance stage. It begins after some











has been proposed by the principal leading to some node
R
$
X . The agent then either accepts the contract or
he refuses it. The payoffs attached to the nodes following these moves are the sequential values for both
players of the subsequent subgames (not shown in Figure 2). A refusal by the agent of the principal’s offer
puts an end to the relationship: zero unit are sold, leaving the principal with a payoff of zero and the agent










￿ . The payoffs obtained when a deal is reached will be detailed later.
The analysis proceeds in three steps. In Step 1, I analyze the perfect information game where the initial
node belongs to the agent and the investment move is observed by the principal. In Step 2, I analyze
the incomplete information game where the initial node belongs to Nature and the investment move is not
observed by the principal. In Step 3, I analyze the complete but imperfect information game where the initial
node belongs to the agent and where the investment move is not observed by the principal. The main result
of the paper is Proposition 2 of Step 3 which characterizes the equilibrium of this latter game.
Y
Step 1: The perfect information game. Suppose that the initial node belongs to the agent and that
the principal observes the investment move. She will then offer to pay a transfer




















































5Inequality (IR) is an individual rationality constraint, stating that the agent is no worse off by accepting





































































X ) binds. Since contracting takes place with perfect infor-
mation, it must yield an ex post efﬁcient allocation and since the principal has all the bargaining power, she
will pay no more than what is required to satisfy (IR
X ).











































































































￿ is identiﬁed in the SE panel of Figure 1. Although ex post efﬁcient, this allocation is ex ante































￿ . Because of the hold-up, there is under-investment and reduced production.
Y
Step 2: The incomplete information game. Let the initial node belong to Nature. Investment
￿ is a
randomly chosen type that is the private information of the agent. The solution of that game is well known:
the principal offers a screening contract that equalizes the expected marginal beneﬁt of production to the
expected marginal informational rent conceded to the agent. This contract is characterized in Proposition 1
and Corollary 1 below. To the extent that the contract depends on the distribution of types, the incomplete
information approach provides a family of contracts as a solution to the screening problem.
Let



































￿ that depend on
the information
j
reported by the agent about his type
￿ . By the Revelation Principle, there is no loss of
generality in considering a Bayesian equilibrium where the agent reports truthfully his type.
Deﬁne the informational rent of a type

































































6Assumption S.C. ensures that investment always increases the agent’s ex post capacity, playing the role
ofasingle-crossingcondition. AssumptionReg. ensuresthatthesolutiontoProgram2belowisasingleton.
q
The following representation then holds:
Proposition 1 Let








































￿ . The incomplete information game has a Bayesian-







































































































































































The agent accepts the contract and truthfully reveals his type.
Y
















































































￿ solve Program 2.
Y
Given an arbitrary distribution of types, Program 2 yields an arbitrary downward sloping dotted curve
Q










h is the ex post virtual surplus


































Corollary 1 vanish. Hence, the real and the maximized virtual surplus coincide at
￿ so that there is “no
distortion at the top”.
When
￿ is strategically chosen by the agent, this solution has a normative content: if the principal holds
beliefs









￿ speciﬁed in Proposition 1. From a positive point
of view, that is, if we are trying to explain the structure of actual screening contracts, this proposition is


















￿ to an agent
7that has invested
￿ . Through
l , that payoff depends on
b ; given an arbitrary















































reaches a strict maximum at
￿
￿
￿ , the agent has an incentive to invest
￿
)
￿ . But then, there is little rationale




strategy on the equilibrium path, she should propose the contract derived in Step 1.
In a setting where the “type” of an agent refers to characteristics that have a clear market value (here,
the opportunity cost of investment) and that are under the agent’s control, it is inappropriate to assume that
the distribution of “types” is an exogenous variable with a predictive content. In such a setting, technology,
preferences, and the strategic opportunities (the fundamentals) alone should explain the structure of screen-
ing contracts. I now depart from the incomplete information model by focusing on a game of complete but
imperfect information where the agent “chooses his type” by choosing
￿ .
Y
Step 3: The complete but imperfect information game. The agent not only has private information
about
￿ , but he also decides its value. The investment
￿ is still a random variable although the randomization
is endogenous. Hence, the results obtained in Step 2 should apply. On the other hand, Proposition 1 is
not applicable if
￿ is not distributed on a bounded set or if the distribution is degenerate. These issues
are addressed in lemmas 1 and 3 below. The equilibrium of this game is presented in Proposition 2. In
equilibrium, the ex post moves of both players are of the form described in Corollary 1, but the distribution
of
￿ is no longer arbitrary and is associated with the agent’s best response strategy. While the analysis in
Step 2 yields a family of contracts as a solution to the screening problem, the complete information approach
selects a single contract in that family, namely the contract associated with the equilibrium distribution of
￿
as chosen by the agent.
Oncetheinvestmentopportunityisreintegratedintothemodel, wehaveagameofcompleteinformation,
since the principal can evaluate the agent’s payoff of playing any of his strategies. The principal can ensure
her payoff realized in Step 1 by offering the equilibrium contract of Step 1 which is always accepted. Yet,
there is more surplus to capture with a screening contract if the agent has invested more than
￿
7 . Hence,









￿ . A strategy for the agent must specify
￿ at
the investment stage and a decision function (acceptance or refusal) at each of the possible nodes of the
acceptance stage. In a subgame perfect equilibrium, the agent accepts any contract that satisﬁes individual
rationality at that stage. In that case, the sequential values of both players at each of these nodes can be
characterized as a function of the contract and the investment level. Hence, a strategy for the agent is
resumed by the choice of
￿ . Lemma 1 establishes that the agent’s choice is bounded:
8Lemma 1 There exists an investment level
￿






￿ does not survive iterative elimi-
nation of weakly dominated strategies.
Y
To construct a Nash equilibrium for this game, I focus on a partial characterization of the best responses
of both players. If a pure strategy equilibrium is played, the principal anticipates the agent’s strategy. Ob-
servability does not matter and the game is to be played like the perfect information game in Step 1. In
an equilibrium where the agent randomizes his investment move, the principal will hold some equilibrium
beliefs
b about this randomization and she will accordingly propose a screening contract based on those











follows readily from Corollary 1.
It is shown in Proposition 2 below that the equilibrium allocation
Q








































The conditional capital demand function
￿
￿
yields the level of investment that minimizes the total cost of





￿ . The function
￿
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Equation (7) deﬁnes a curve in the SE panel of Figure 1 that represents the relationship between
￿ and
￿
at the point of tangency between any straight vertical line passing through some
￿ and some isocost curve.





is a strictly increasing
function as well. Let
￿
￿





















￿ is the price for which
investing































































































￿ . The following lemma relates the function
￿
￿ to
the long-run cost curve.
Lemma 2
￿





Lemma 2 is illustrated in Figure 1. Starting from an investment level



























































￿ . The cost of producing at point






























7 . Hence, there are always strict gains
from trade to be realized at the contracting stage. Because each player is trying to secure these gains for
themselves, we get the following simple but important result.
Lemma 3 The complete information game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategy.
Y
In an equilibrium in pure strategies, all moves are anticipated along the equilibrium path. Observability









￿ like in Step 1, the agent should invest strictly more than
￿
7 to minimize costs.
Hence, the pure strategy proﬁle identiﬁed in Step 1 does not hold as an equilibrium when investment is
not observed. Figure 1 illustrates the cobweb-like strategic structure of this game. If the principal thinks
that her agent invested













￿ , she identiﬁes point
￿
B























X . If the agent expects to produce in point
￿
￿



























































h . The complete but imperfect information game has a Nash equilibrium in

































































































































The agent accepts the contract and truthfully reveals his investment move.
Y
In Proposition 2, the key equation is (8). In equilibrium, the agent is ready to randomize his investment
move only if he is indifferent about its value. But since the principal plays a pure strategy, the agent antici-
pates his production level
￿ and, given
￿ , he is never indifferent about
















￿ is incentive compatible if type

























￿ is a necessary condition to have both indifference and incentive compatibility.
‹
Once (8) is established, the rest of the proposition follows easily. For (5) to characterize
￿
￿ as the best
response of the principal,
v must be of the form given by (11). In (10), recovering the distribution
b from
its associated hazard rate
v involves solving an ordinary differential equation.
› Given (8) and (11),
v is
completely speciﬁed; hence (10) is obtained. Applying (3) yields (9).
Given the equilibrium strategy
b for the agent, the contract offered by the principal is the screening
contract described in Proposition 1. Since all pure strategies in the support of the mixed strategy played
by the agent must yield the same payoff, his ex post informational rent must match the investment cost of






7 , he does so with the intent of




















￿ of the equilibrium contract conceded to a type
￿ agent compensates exactly for that amount.
These are quasi-rents, in the Marshallian sense, since these rents are nothing more than a minimum fair
return on past investment in capital (Hart 1995).
The incomplete information approach of Step 2 statesthat the agentshould produce an amount thatmax-
imizes the ex post virtual surplus. The complete information approach of Step 3 states that the agent should
produce an amount that turns his rent into a quasi-rent. It is rational to invest as long as the opportunity cost
of investment is no greater than the ex post informational rent associated to a higher investment level. The



































































































ﬂ ” is the composition operator (see the proof of Lemma 2). The transfer combines a ﬁxed payment
￿
7 and a conditional payment that evolves with the long-run cost. Having received
￿
7 , a “type”
￿ agent must
then choose
















￿ . By the envelope property of the long-run cost function,





















From (12) or (13), the equilibrium contract is a cost-plus contract, generally considered to be at the
11lowest end of the spectrum of incentive contracts. However, the contract does provide incentives to produce
efﬁciently, since an agent who produces
￿ does so at the lowest possible cost on his long-run cost curve. It is
only to the extent that he does not invest
￿
￿ with certainty that the allocation remains inefﬁcient. Investment
is nevertheless greater than in the perfect information case of Step 1.
As is apparent from (10) and (11), the shape of the distribution of investment depends on the opportunity
cost function alone. The following analytical examples show that the technological assumptions allow many
shapes of the density function: In the ﬁrst example, the distribution is skewed to the right, in the second it is
uniform, while in the third, it is skewed to the left.
Y




























































￿ . The efﬁcient allocation is to invest
￿

































￿ and gets a





























￿ . The density increases on
c





























































. If investment is not observable, the equilibrium allocation is




































































































￿ . If investment is not observable, the equilibrium allocation is




























































. It has a decreasing density and is
skewed to the left.
123. Comparative Statics
￿
Consider a family of cost functions parameterized by
￿ . As
￿ changes, the equilibrium contract
and the equilibrium distribution














￿ is deﬁned, the contract
￿
￿ is obtained directly from (7). What is less obvious though is how this
change affects the equilibrium distribution of investment. Suppose that, as
￿ changes
￿ , the new agent’s
randomization ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the old one; allowing a slight abuse of terminology, I will
say that investment becomes stochastically larger.
￿
7
Proposition 3 Suppose that
￿






￿ . Then invest-
ment becomes stochastically larger as
￿ is increased.
Y
Corollary 2 Suppose that
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c . Then investment becomes stochastically larger as
￿ is increased.
Y
I present two variations of the base model that permit comparative statics using these results. In the ﬁrst,
Proposition 3 is used to show that an increase in the reservation price of the agent leads to more investment.
In the second, Corollary 2 is used to show that an increase in the bargaining power of the agent or in the
privacy of his investment move leads to more investment.
Y
Market opportunity. Suppose that the good may be produced either in a generic or in a speciﬁc




on the market. The speciﬁc variety can
also be sold at price
¯ on the market but can only be bought from the agent at a price to be agreed upon. The
principal values the generic variety at zero. The market does not attribute a different value to the speciﬁc
variety but the principal does. There are no economies of scope in using the agent’s installed capacity for a
joint production of both varieties so that the cost of producing any bundle of the two varieties is a function






















￿ is sold to the principal and
˘ is
sold on the market. Given
￿ , the agent will choose











































































































































































The agent either uses all his capacity to supply the principal (by raising his short-run marginal cost above
the market price) and his opportunity cost equals the production cost, or he retains some capacity and the
13opportunity cost of contracting equals the actual loss in market sales
¯
x
￿ net of the total proﬁt he could have






























Consider applying the technological assumptions presented in section 2 to
Q
&
with assumption Int. simply





￿ , these assumptions translate
directly to
&


























































7 which is the maximum amount the












































A rise in the market price








￿ in the NE panel of Figure 1 along the long-run












￿ curve is not affected






￿ . As a result, the effect of a rise in the
market price is characterized by a shrinking of












7 strictly increases with the market price
¯ , Proposition 3 implies that a rise in the market






￿ : the principal has the bargaining power at the contracting stage;
event




￿ (the complement of




the investment is observed by the principal. Assume that both players commonly learn which combination
of eventsis realized after theinvestmentstagebut priorcontracting takeplace(inpoint
￿ in Figure2). When
the agent has all the bargaining power, the allocation (then decided by the agent) is efﬁcient and independent
of whether his investment was observed or not. Partition














be the marginal probability that the principal has the bargaining power and
￿ be the conditional (on
￿ )




































￿ are to be interpreted as measures of the the expected bargaining power of the
















































￿ , the agent














its associated short-run proﬁt function. In the event
￿
￿

















￿ , the principal (now fully informed) will also propose that the agent should produce











￿ like in Step 1. The problem is to characterize the ex ante investment move of the agent and the






































































































￿ , the agent’s expected proﬁt if the principal buys




















￿ . If the function
Q
&
satisﬁes the technological assumptions, so does
&
. The





￿ are then given by Proposition 2. Notice that
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Lemma 4 below ensures that Corollary 2 applies, so that a decrease in
￿
or an increase in
￿ leads to a
stochastically larger investment.















































When investment is unobserved by the principal, its expected level rises as the agent is given more
incentives to invest, thus increasing the incidence of ex post inefﬁciencies in production. Under perfect
information, the agent invests too little but always produces efﬁciently. Under imperfect information, the
agent invests more but generally under-produces. Since he receives a payoff
￿
7 whether or no the game is
played under asymmetric or symmetric information, and since the principal can always ensure herself the
equilibriumpayoffoftheperfectinformationgame, unobservabilityincreasessocialwelfare. Thisisinsharp
contrast with Bayesian games of incomplete information where the unobservability of types diminishes
social welfare as players engage in rent-seeking behavior.
15This important difference can be explained by a classical second-best argument: when dealing with
one market imperfection (non commitment), introducing another (imperfect information) may improve efﬁ-
ciency. This effect does not appear in traditional Bayesian models, because it is assumed that the distribution
of types is exogenous, and therefore unaffected by the observability issue. It follows that going from unob-
servable to observable types increases welfare as all inefﬁciencies associated with bargaining under asym-
metric information are resolved. When “types” are endogenous, observability causes the type distribution
to collapse to
￿
7 at a great cost in social welfare. Unobservability allows more “types” to be played and the
presence of more efﬁcient types dominates the fact that most types now produce inefﬁciently.
The approach takenherecanbeextendedtomostadverseselectionmodelstoimprove ourunderstanding
of contracts both on normative and positive grounds. Incomplete information models are routinely used, for
instance in the regulatory literature (see Laffont and Tirole, 1993) to rationalize the use of high-powered
incentives schemes like price caps in lieu of rate-of-return regulation. In such a setting, the distribution of
types is assumed exogenous and the return to a “good” type is considered a “rent”. Any conclusion about the
relative merits of various compensation schemes will depend heavily on the assumptions made with respect
to the distribution of types.
For example, if a principal believes that the proportion of high-cost types in a population is high, she
should construct an incentive scheme designed mainly for these types; that is, an incentive scheme that
allows the few low-cost types to extract a lot of informational rent. But if the distribution of “types” is
endogenous, then these high rents motivate high-cost agents to improve their “type”. In the end, because of
the distribution shift, the principal may end up paying a larger rent than she intended.
This study internalizes all of these effects. The equilibrium contract shares the same qualitative features
as the incomplete information model, but it is robust to the feedback effect of a given contract on the
distribution of “types”. Factors that affect the incentives to invest determine the equilibrium distribution of
types and thus the nature of the contract.
From a positive point of view, the aim of contract and organization theory is to explain economic struc-
tures as a systemic endogenous response to address transaction costs. In particular, opportunity costs gener-
ated by opportunistic behavior and asymmetrical information are assumed paramount. Ultimately, the links
between pure technological factors (or preferences) and economic structures should be explicit. Models
that rely on an exogenously speciﬁed distribution of (economic) types are an important but transitional step
toward the development of such a theory. The screening contract constructed here does not depend on an
exogenous distribution of types but it takes as given the commitment capabilities of the players. A natural
step forward for future research would be to endogenize these capabilities.
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18A Appendix
￿
The proofs of all the lemmas, propositions and of corollaries follow.
Proof of Proposition 1. Given




























































































































































Equation (IC) expresses the incentive compatibility constraints. Given that the agent reports information
j
about
￿ that maximizes his ex post payoff, they state that reporting
￿ should be a best response for a type
￿ agent.
Program 2 is a classical principal-agent problem à la Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) that can be solved
using the differentiable approach that resumes the constraints (IC) via their associated ﬁrst-order conditions









￿ , the ﬁrst-order condition








































































￿ , so that the term in the square brackets vanishes. If
￿ is an increasing
function, (A1) will also be sufﬁcient to solve (IC).
￿




































h yields (3). Using (2), the (IR
X
























￿ so that the (IR
X
X ) constraint of type
￿ subsumes all the others.





￿ into the maximand of Program 2.
Express that maximand in terms of ex post virtual surplus by integrating by parts and replace the (IC) and
(IR
X









￿ to get the reduced form given in the proposition. Q.E.D.









￿ is a necessary condition. Consider the relaxed program where constraint (4)






￿ so that the






￿ characterizes a global maximum. If the solution of the relaxed
program is monotonous, then it also solves Program 2. Q.E.D.
19Proof of Lemma 1. Once








￿ may be realized. The
principal’s payoff is bounded below by zero: any contract that would result in a negative payoff against
some type


















￿ in that event. Consequently, the
































￿ is now dominated by
￿
7 . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let “





















￿ . Stab. and S.C. ensure that























































































































￿ is the identity function. Q.E.D.




































￿ . Similarly, the best response of the agent to any
￿






￿ in order to minimize costs. These two best response functions















































￿ is then strictly less than the feasible payoff
￿
7 . Since the agent is not maximizing at the investment
stage, we have a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that the agent’s equilibrium strategy
b has support
c and is given by (10)





















































, so that there are no atoms at














































































































￿ . Applying (3) then yields (9).
I now verify that randomizing on





























































































































￿ . It is discontinuous in
￿
￿ and zero afterward. Since marginal cost is increasing,














































7 . In this case, increasing production as long as marginal revenue is
























































































￿ that is no
greater than
￿






￿ lies everywhere below
the marginal revenue curve. He produces
￿











































that is strictly less than
￿
7 . It follows that











c is independent of
￿ so that he is ready to randomize. The randomization may then be
set arbitrarily to
b . We have an equilibrium. Q.E.D.






































































￿ , which is equivalent to ﬁrst-order



































































































































The ﬁrst two bracketed terms are positive. When
&
is separable with respect to
￿ and
￿ , the last bracketed
term on the r.h.s. vanishes, and
v is positively related to
￿
￿ , hence negatively related to
￿ . Proposition 3 can
then be applied. Q.E.D.















. An agent who invests
￿
￿ at the top of the equilibrium

















￿ . Differentiate (14) with respect to



































































































is strictly concave in
































































































































































































































































































































￿ Hart and Moore (1988) have initiated a string of models where a hold-up occurs because ex post
renegotiation is unavoidable and contracts are assumed to be incomplete. Information is symmetric between
both contracting parties while a third enforcing party (the courts) stays uninformed. An appropriate design
of the renegotiation process (Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey, 1994; Noldeke and Schmidt, 1995) or of the
litigation process (Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996) can solve the hold-up problem in this context.
￿
In game theoretic words, this is not a “type” but a “move”. Nevertheless, the (quoted) word “type” will
be used for an investment level since it characterizes ex post the agent’s payoff function like a true type does
in the agency literature.
￿ Therearesomeolderexamplesinnon-strategiccompetitivesettingsinthe“quality-guaranteeingprices”
literature. See Shapiro’s (1986) model of a lemon market where sellers have the choice, through investment
in human capital, to either sell lemons or quality services. Daughety and Reinganum (1995) have proposed
a model where an endogenous “type” distribution emerges when ﬁrms play a pure strategy with respect to
an R&D investment decision that involves a random outcome. The distinction should be made between
models in which the informed parties play pure strategies that exogenously involve a random outcome and
those, such as in this paper, where different pure strategies are played that belong to the support of a same
mixed strategy. Adapted to a strategic setting, Shapiro’s model would fall into the latter class while the other
belongs to the former. The important difference between the two classes of models is that observability of
the strategy played yields no strategic effect in the pure strategy case – only the outcome matters.
For instance, Laffont and Tirole’s (1993) version of the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
does not result in a mixed strategy for investment because they make the implicit assumption that it is
not possible to contract after investment has taken place but prior the agent knows precisely his random
production set. Furthermore, investment does not affect the support of that random set. One can show
in that context that it is does not pay for the principal to induce separation of agents with respect to their
investment level (which is not related to the feasible ex post gains to trade). The agent’s payoff function then
becomes strictly concave in investment and has a unique maximizer that is played in pure strategy.
E The value
￿












￿ in this section but it takes a different value in the
ﬁrst application of section 3. See footnote 12.
P The marker
￿ in Figure 2 is used in section 3.
23q Consider the slopes of any two short-run marginal cost curves at
￿ such as points
￿ and
¢ of Figure 1.
When assumption Reg. holds, the slope at point
￿ is no lesser than the slope at point
¢ .



































￿ which is a ﬁrst-order linear differential equation
solved by (10).
￿ Differentiability with respect to





￿ be random variables with distributions
b and
ı . The variable



























￿ is a family of differ-











D is said to be stochastically larger than





X that have the same distributions as
D and















￿ This monotonicity condition is not related to the usual one which speciﬁes how
v changes with
￿ . In the














￿ ) to ensure that
Q
￿










7 in Figure1 isnot zeroas in the basemodel becausetheopportunity cost function
&
does not
satisfy the technological assumptions everywhere. Notice that
&











￿ . Nevertheless, the structure of


























































































































































where the equality holds only in
￿
7 . Hence, a “type”
￿
7 agent is paid a price
¯ by the principal. This agent
is indifferent between producing for the market or the principal. Proposition 2 selects an equilibrium where
this agent produces only for the principal. For any other
￿ , the principal pays more than the market and the
24agent produces only for the principal.
￿




















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: A sketch of the game in extensive form.
27